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adopted by the Senate, although a similar bill also was introduced in the Senate. 6 It is likely that the present Congress will seriously consider the enactment of a reorganization statute covering municipal corporations.7 Such a
statute presents serious questions of policy which cannot be considered here,
but there can be no doubt as to the wisdom of including industrial corporations,
which face precisely the same difficulties as the railroads in attempting to reorganize through equity receiverships.
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VEN a cursory examination of the Supreme Court reports for the last few
years will make evident the fact that the number of cases in which the
courts are called upon to interpret and apply statutes is steadily increasing. In
passing upon these cases the courts have universally declared that it is their
duty to interpret acts in accordance with the intent of Congress, and not themselves to legislate. It is of great importance to business men, to members of the
bar who advise them, and to administrative departments of the government
which are making rules to carry out the will of Congress, that they should know
the means which the court will use in determining such intent, and how far instruments other than the statute itself can be relied upon in the process of interpretation.
It is well settled that where the language of the law is clear and the construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impractical consequences,
the words are to be taken as final, and nothing else can be resorted to in order
to determine its meaning.,
6S. 5551, introduced January io, 1933 by Senator Hastings.
67 In the corporate reorganization section of H.R. 14359, which, as stated above, was not
adopted by the Senate, "drainage, irrigation, levee, sewer and paving improvement districts
established under the laws of the State of their creation" were included along with industrial
corporations. Senator Fletcher, on January io, 1933, introduced an amendment to H.R. 14359
embracing a reorganization section, modelled on the others, to cover "any municipality or
other political subdivision of any State." The amendment was not adopted, but Senator
Fletcher has introduced a similar bill (S. 4o3) in the present session of Congress, and a separate
bill with the same object but differing in many respects from the Fletcher bill has been introduced in the House by Representative McLeod (H.R. 4311). It is likely that these bills will
receive prompt consideration by the respective Judiciary Committees.
* Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
'United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 269,49 Sup. Ct. 133, 73 L.Ed. 3 22 (1928);
Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. I12, 73 L.Ed. 31X (1928);
Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 295 Fed. 225 (1924); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 6i L.Ed. 442 (1917); Standard Fashion Co. v. McGrane Houston
Co., 258 U.S. 346,42 Sup. Ct. 36o, 66 L.Ed. 653 (1921); Ozawa v. United States, 26o U.S. 178,
43 Sup. Ct. 65, 67 L.Ed. X99 (X922); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287
U.S. 77, 53 Sup. Ct. 42, 77 L.Ed. 94 (1932).
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If, however, the statute is either ambiguous or obscure, so that the intent of
Congress would not be easy to gather solely from the words used, the court may
depend on other evidence to establish its meaning, notably, the reports of committees of Congress and the statement of the chairman or other member of the
committee who is in charge of the bill.2
In order to understand the connection between the activities of the committee and congressional intent, some knowledge of legislative procedure is necessary. When a bill is introduced into Congress it is immediately referred to one
of the standing committees, and, except in rare cases, it does not reappear on the
floor of Congress for passage until it has been carefully considered in that committee. Thus it is in the committees of Congress that the actual work is done of
determining whether a situation exists which requires a remedy, what remedy
should be applied, and what administrative devices should be used.
When submitting the bill to Congress it is customary for the committee to
prepare and submit a report explaining the grounds for its action, the factual
and legal bases upon which the statute rests, and the committee's understanding
of the nature and effect of the bill. The hearings, and frequently briefs in support of or against the measure, together with explanatory memoranda prepared
by the committee's counsel, are also printed and form part of the record before
Congress.
When the bill is introduced it is customary for the member of the committee
in charge of the bill, normally the chairman, to explain it in a speech, and afterward in debate to answer questions as to the meaning of particular sections or
phrases in the bill. As the committeeman in charge has the burden of defending
the bill he has familiarized himself with the situation to be dealt with, both as to
fact and as to law, and his statements may be taken as the opinion of the committee as to what it meant by the bill as introduced. Where a bill passes,
either unchanged as introduced by the committee or with few changes, it is fair
to assume that Congress has adopted as its intent the intent of the committee,
and that the documents setting forth the intent of the committee, including the
speech and answers to questions made on the floor by the member in charge,
may be consulted to ascertain the will of Congress. If in the course of the debate a change is made in the wording of the bill, either with the approval of the
committee member in charge or at the suggestion of another member, the statement of the member suggesting the amendment is also authoritative as to his
meaning.
Two cases will illustrate the use of a committee report to explain the meaning
of phrases obscure only because of their context. The provision of the Clayton
Act giving a person accused in certain contempt proceedings the right to trial
by jury, used the word "may." In order to aid in determining whether the word
"may" should be mandatory and not permissive, in other words, should practically be given the meaning "shall," the court referred to the report of the
2Duplex

Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349
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Judiciary Committee of the House to the effect that trial is to be by the court
in certain specified cases, but adds "in other cases the trial is to be by jury."
Thus, said the court:
The intent of Congress in adopting the provision was to give to the accused a right
of trial by jury; not merely to vest authority in the judge to call a jury at his discretion.3
In determining whether the word "stayed," used in a section of the Revenue
Act of 1928, included a voluntary delay as well as a stay under a judicial order
or by virtue of statute, the court made use of the committee reports and especially of the report of the House Committee where the phrase originated.4 In
the lower courts there had been a division of opinion as to the meaning of the
expression and also as to the propriety of using the committee reports. One court
had remarked that it was unnecessary to quote the language of the report, as the
word "stayed" must be given its plain meaning,5 whereas other courts had
used the committee report in deducing the rule which was finally approved by
6
the Supreme Court.
The question as to whether an act is so clear as to make it unnecessary to use
a committee report in interpreting it, is far from easy to determine. For example, in a recent case a section of the Food and Drugs Act was involved, refusing
shipment in interstate commerce to food or drugs:
Third. If in package form, the quantity of the contents be not plainly and conspicuously marked on the outside of the package in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count: Provided, however, That reasonable variations shall be permitted, and
tolerances and also exemptions as to small packages shall be established by rules and
regulations made in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of this Act.7
The point involved was whether rules and regulations could be made in respect
to variations. The court decided that they could, and reached this result by
adding a comma after the word "established." So punctuated, the court said, it
was obvious that the provision as to rules and regulations would apply to the
first clause relating to variations as well as to the second, relating to tolerances
and exemptions. "Punctuation marks," said the court, "are no part of an act.
To determine the intent of the law, the court, in construing a statute, will disregard the punctuation, or will repunctuate, if that be necessary, in order to arrive at the natural meaning of the words employed."7a
Inferentially the court admits that without the change in the punctuation,
3Michaelson v. United States ex rel. C. St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 266 U.S. 4 2, 70, 45
169 (I924).
4 Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 51 Sup. Ct. x86, 75 L.Ed. 415 (1930).
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s United States v. Burden, Smith & Co., 33 F. (2d) 229 (1929).
6Regla Coal Co. v. Bowers, 37 F. (2d) 373 (S.D. N.Y. 1929).
7 United States v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 53 Sup. Ct. 42, 77 L.Ed.
94 (193).
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it would be hard to construe the clause authorizing rules and regulations, as applying to the proviso "that reasonable variations shall be permitted." Without
the comma added, the meaning would seem clearly contrary to the meaning
which the court was forced to justify by adding a comma. This then would seem
to have been a case of doubt in which the court, according to its own rule, should
have given due regard to the committee report, which "agreed with the view
that the authority to make rules and regulations was confined to the establishment of tolerances and exemptions," in other words, did not apply to "reasonable variations." In concurring, Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo remarked
that "the statute, as punctuated, reads as its legislative history shows Congress
8'
intended it to read."
In this case the statute could have been made perfectly clear by reference to
the committee report, but there was another means of interpretation which was
given greater weight by the majority of the court. The executive department
charged with the administration of the act had from the beginning adopted the
interpretation accepted by the majority of the court, and had incorporated it
into its rules and regulations. Apparently the court was unwilling to modify
the long-continued administrative practice, to which, as it remarked, no objection had been made by Congress, and in fact preferred to disregard the will of
Congress at the time of the passage of the act, as shown by the committee report, rather than to disregard the long-continued practice of the administration.
The court has taken a realistic view of the procedure in Congress by singling
out from the general debate on a bill, the statements made by a member of the
committee in charge of the bill on the floor. Such speeches may be regarded as
authorized statements by the agent of the committee of what its intention
was, and where there is doubt as to the meaning of the words of the act, may be
considered as having been taken by the members of the House or Senate as
authoritative, and therefore as expressing their will. The court has well expressed this point of view in its opinion in the case of the Duplex PrintingPress
v. Deering:9
This was the final work of the House committee on the subject, and was uttered under such circumstances and with such impressive emphasis that it is not going too far
to say that, except for this exposition of the meaning of the section (Clayton Act, §20),
it would not have been enacted in the form in which it was reported. In substantially
that form it became law; and since, in our opinion, its proper construction is entirely
in accord with its purpose as thus declared, little need be added.
In the case at bar the statement of the committee chairman was made in answer to a question by another member who suggested an amendment to the bill,
which was opposed by the chairman on the ground that the bill as it was drafted
covered the point which was contained in the amendment, and that, therefore,
the amendment was unnecessary. 10
8
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9 254 U.S. 443, 477, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349 (1920).
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In another case the court depended on the amendment offered by the member
in charge of a bill to take care of an objection urged by another member during
the debate, and his explanations of the amendment were taken into consideration as "throwing light upon the meaning of the proviso.",,
It is an interesting indication of the change in the attitude of the court toward statements of committee members to observe that in the opinion in Uinited
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 2 the court refused to take into
consideration the statement of Senator Hoar who, as a member of the committee
on conference from the Senate, reported the conference bill to the Senate.3 The
court, however, after a long and somewhat involved argument arrived at the
conclusion that the bill meant exactly what Senator Hoar said it meant, so that,
although it was not willing to admit that the members of Congress accepted
Senator Hoar's interpretation of the meaning of the act, it found that the will of
Congress was in fact the will of the committee as reported by its authorized
representative on the floor.
In a more recent case, the court might have saved itself a considerable amount
of trouble had it been willing to take the statement of the chairman of the
Senate committee rather than reason about the meaning of a word. The Interstate Commerce Act applied to "railroads." The question at issue was whether
street railroads were included in the term. The chairman of the Senate committee, in reporting the bill, had declared that the word "railroads" did not cover
street railroads. The court, failing to appreciate the difference which the Duplex
case made clear between general debate and the statements of the chairman,
refused to consider his statements as other than part of the debate, and then
went on to find out in another manner that Congress meant what the chairman
said it meant. 4 It is obvious that the court has grown in understanding of the
ways of Congress; and without an understanding of how a legislative body goes
about making its decision, it is indeed difficult for a judge to determine what is
the will of that legislative body.
Reports and statements of chairmen of committees stand on a very different
footing from that of general debates. These debates, it has been long established, are "expressive of the views and motives of individual members, and are
not a safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning
11United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 38 Sup. Ct. 525, 62 L.Ed. 1130
(1918).
12 i66 U.S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L.Ed. 1007 (1897).
131Where a bill has passed in one House and is amended in the other, if the House in which
it first passed does not agree to the amendment, the bill is sent to a committee of conference
where the differences are adjusted, and an agreed bill is reported back to each House. The
statements made by the members of the conference committee in reporting or explaining the
bill on the floor of either House are of great weight in the interpreting of a doubtful statute.
This was recognized in United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 569, 65 L.Ed. xo84
(1921). See also, United States ex rel. Fazio v. Tod, 285 Fed. 847 (C.C.A. 2d i922).
11 Omaha and Council Bluffs Street Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 230
U.S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. 890, 56 L.Ed. 324 (1912).
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and purpose of the lawmaking body."'s The reason for the rule was well stated
by the court when it passed on the meaning of the Sherman Act. In his opinion
Justice Peckham said:
The reason is that it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction
was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed it by resorting
to the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have
agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other ..... 16
The court may go even further than using the committee report to interpret
doubtful language in the act. Where a particular interpretation of an act would
lead to a result which seems contrary to the apparent purpose of the act, the
court has resorted to the reports of a committee in order to determine whether or
not the words of the act should be departed from in a particular case. The contract labor law, for example, applied to the importation of aliens under contract
to labor. The question was whether a contract with an alien to become rector of
a church was within the act. The court depended on an extract from the report
of the Senate committee, recommending the passage of the bill, to show that the
intent of the committee was that the act should not apply to a professional man.
In its report the committee said that it considered the word "labor" would apply
only to manual labor and rejected a suggested amendment to substitute the expression "manual labor" on the ground that it was unnecessary. This extract
from the report, the court said, was "a circumstance throwing light upon the
17
intent of the Congress."'
Again, to determine the scope of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the
court in its opinion quoted from the report of a House committee, saying:
.... and the report of the Congressional committee having the bill in charge disdoses, without afty uncertainty, that it was intended to be very comprehensive, to
withdraw all injuries to railroad employees in interstate commerce from the operation
of varying state laws, and to apply to them a national law having a uniform application throughout all the states.' 8
Is Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475,41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349 (1920).
x6United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290, 318, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L.Ed.
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(1896).

See also: United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 38 Sup. Ct. 525, 62
L.Ed. 1130 (1918); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 34 Sup. Ct. 196, 58 L.Ed. 515 (1924);
Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 24 SUp. Ct. 816, 48 L.Ed. 2o87 (1903). In McCaughan
v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493, 51 Sup. Ct. 510, 75 L.Ed. 1183 (1930), the court
said: "Nor do we think of significance the fact relied upon here and by the court below that
statements inconsistent with the conclusion which we reach were made to committees of Congress or in discussions on the floor of the Senate by Senators who were not in charge of the bill.
For reasons which need not be restated, such individual expressions are without weight in the
interpretation of a statute."
17 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed.
226 (1892).

18N.Y. C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L.Ed. 1045, 1048 (,9,7).
See also: St. L., Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct. 704, 59 L.Ed.
116o (1915); McLean v. United States, 226 U.S. 374, 33 Sup. Ct. 122, 57 L.Ed. 260 (19x2);
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Another source of information resorted to in the construction of acts is the
committee hearings, which are important in determining the factual situation
with which the act was intended to deal.' 9 Chief Justice Taft has explained the
purpose for which hearings may be used, in his opinion sustaining the Packers'
Act.20
In his statement setting forth the situation which confronted Congress, the
object which the act was intended to accomplish and the evil with which Congress was dealing, he depended upon the hearings before the Committee to show
how the trade in livestock was carried on and to show that there was a monopoly on the part of certain packing companies. The evidence printed in the hearings not only informed the court as to the general purpose of the act, thus aiding
its interpretation, but was of importance in deciding the question of its constitutionality. In order to sustain the constitutionality of the regulation of a great
trade as a reasonable exercise of the police power, the court must be persuaded
that there was an evil and that the act might reasonably be expected to correct
it without putting an undue burden on the business regulated. Furthermore, it
had to be shown that the stockyards which were regulated by the act, were an instrument of interstate and foreign commerce so as to fall within the jurisdiction
of the federal government. For these two purposes, the facts deduced by the
2
court from the hearings, were of very great importance. 1
Committee reports are now definitely a part of the equipment of the court for
the interpretation of the meaning of statutes and for deciding their constitutionality. They are not decisive but they are persuasive. While there are no
Supreme Court cases in which the opinion is based squarely on a report, a review of the decisions makes it apparent that the judges are turning to them increasingly for help in case of doubt. This tendency coincides with the improvement in the preparation of reports by committees and their counsel, so that the
judges have instruments better fitted to their hands. Whether reports will be
Win. Cramp & Sons Ship & Eng. Bldg. Co. v. Int. Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28,
38 Sup. Ct. 271, 62 L.Ed. 56o (1918); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40
Sup. Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920).
,9Hearings were used generally to determine the situation with which Congress was dealing
in adopting certain provisions of the Seamen's Act. O'Hara v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 269 U.S.
364, 7o L.Ed. 311 (1928). As statements made at the hearings often come from interested parties, they cannot be given greater weight than as a guide to the facts which were present in the
minds of the committee members when they decided upon the action which they reported.
M Caughan v. Hershey, 283 U.S. 488, 51 Sup. Ct. 510, 75 L.Ed. 1183 (1930).
- Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 513,

42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L.Ed. 735, 740 (1921).
21There is a striking instance in the New York decisions of the effect of a finding of fact by a
legislative committee, in this case a committee of inquiry on the constitutionality of a law. The
New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395 (19x5), abandoned the
rule laid down in People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131 (19o8), holding finally that a statute forbidding night work for women was constitutional, and basing its reversal upon the report of a legislative committee of inquiry, whose fact findings revealed that the classification was reasonable.

